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LIST OF PARTIES 
At the time of preparation of this brief the parties to 
this action are the same as those listed in the caption, except 
that Kenneth A. Okasaki has been voluntarily dismissed from the 
action. This appeal only directly involves the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman who was dismissed from the 
action over the Plaintiffs1 objection. 
The Defendants Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and Coffman, 
Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation, who are not 
parties to this appeal, are represented by Tim Dalton Dunn and 
Anne Swensen who also represent the Defendant-Respondent Penelope 
Dalton Coffman in this appeal. 
The Defendant Anthony M. Thurber, who is not a party to 
this appeal, is represented by Thomas L. Kay, P.O. Box 45385, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385, (801) 532-1500. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS, 
a professional corporation 
also known as COFFMAN and 
COFFMAN, ANTHONY M. THURBER, 
and KENNETH A, OKAZAKI, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
(PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
Defendant-Respondent) 
Case No. 860167 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
A. Are partners in a law firm who are not actively 
involved in a case vicariously liable for the professional 
malpractice of other partners in the law firm? 
B. Does the structuring of a law firm partnership as a 
professional corporation under the Utah Professional Corporation 
Act, Section 16-11-1 et. seq. of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, shield a member of the firm from vicarious liability for 
1 
the professional malpractice of other members of the firm? 
Statement of the Case 
This is an appeal of the dismissal of Defendant-
Respondent Penelope Dalton Coffman (hereinafter called "Penelope 
D. Coffman") from a legal malpractice action. The dismissal 
followed a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss which was in effect 
treated as a motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter called "the Stewarts") 
brought suit against Penelope D. Coffman, Aldine J, Coffman, Jr., 
Coffman, Coffman & Woods, P.C., and others alleging inter alia, 
that the Stewarts lost a major lawsuit because of malpractice on 
the part of Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. as well as other named 
attorneys who had represented them. The Stewarts, inter alia, 
alleged that the Coffman defendants had negligently allowed their 
counterclaim to be dismissed with prejudice Eor failure to 
properly plead and properly and timely amend when granted leave 
to do so. (R.l-8)i 
Penelope D. Coffman and Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. were at 
the time of the alleged malpractice members of the law firm of 
Coffman and Coffman, a professional corporation. The firm name 
had subsequently been changed to Coffman, Coffman & Woods, P.C., 
by the time the involved suit was filed. (R. 1-8, 59-61). 
Penelope D. Coffman filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint against her for failure to state a cause of action 
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alleging by memorandum that she had not personally represented 
the Stewarts, The motion was initially denied by the court on 
the ground that, aside from unverified allegations in her 
memorandum, Penelope D. Coffman had not shown that she had no 
personal involvement in the matters alleged. (R. 30-58). 
Penelope D. Coffman then filed a motion to reconsider and an 
affidavit wherein she admitted that she was a member of the 
professional corporation, but alleged that she had no personal 
involvement in representing the Stewarts. (R. 59-61; 70-71). 
The Stewarts possessed no evidence to show that Penelope D. 
Coffman had ever talked to them or worked on their case and, on 
such basis only, the Court dismissed Penelope D. Coffman from the 
lawsuit. (R. 72-74; 135-137). The dismissal was entered against 
the Stewarts1 contentions that under the provisions of the Utah 
Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et.seq. of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Penelope D. Coffman and Aldine 
J. Coffman, Jr. were, in matters of professional liability to 
clients, partners and, under partnership law, Penelope D. Coffman 
was jointly and severally liable for the actions of Aldine J. 
Coffman, Jr. even if she never actively represented the Stewarts. 
(R. 35-43) . The Stewarts thereupon filed this appeal of the 
dismissal. (R. 138-149). Copies of relevent pleadings and both 
Memorandum Decisions are included in the Addendum. 
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Summary of Argument 
Under partnership law, partners of law firms are 
vicariously liable for the professionally wrongful acts of other 
partners who represent clients of the law firm. The Utah 
Professional Corporation Act allows lawyers and law firms the 
opportunity to incorporate, but, by its provisions, does not 
alter the traditional standards of professional liability arising 
out of the practice of law including the doctrine of vicarious 
liability of law firm members. Therefore, Penelope D. Coffman is 
vicariously liable for the malpractice of Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. 
as a de facto partner even though the law firm is structured as a 
professional corporation. The trial court committed reversible 
error in dismissing her as a defendant. 
Argument 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
DISMISSING PENELOPE D. COFFMAN FROM THE ACTION 
SINCE SHE IS AND WAS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE 
ACTS OF ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR. 
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and Penelope D. Coffman are each 
members of the Defendant law firm Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a 
professional corporation. (R. 24-29; 32-34; 59-61). The 
I 
professional corporation, if it in fact exists, must be 
incorporated under authority of the Utah Professional Corporation 
Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq. of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
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Prior to the adoption of the Professional Corporation Act 
in 1963, law firms necessarily existed in the form of 
partnerships subject to the liabilities imposed by partnership 
law
* Petition of Bar Asso. 55 Hawaii 121, 516 P.2d 1267 (1973). 
Williams v. Burns, 463 F Supp 1278, (D.C. Colo, 1979). Sections 
48-1-10, 11 and 12 of the Utah General Partnership Actf which was 
adopted in 1921, provide that the partnership and all partners as 
of the date liability arose are jointly and severally liable for 
the wrongful acts or omissions of any partner acting in the 
ordinary course of business. These sections read as follows: 
48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful 
act. Where by any wrongful act or omission of 
any partner acting in the ordinary course of the 
business of the partnership or with the authority 
of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any 
person, not being a partner in the partnership, 
or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is 
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner 
so acting or omitting to act. 
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of 
trust. The partnership is bound to make good the 
loss: 
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of 
his apparent authority receives money or property 
of a third person and misapplies it; and, 
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its 
business receives money or property of a third 
person and the money or property so received is 
misapplied by any partner while it is in the 
custody of the partnership. 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
All partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything 
chargeable' to the partnership under sections 48-
1-10 and 48-1-11. 
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(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations 
of the partnership; but any partner may enter 
into a separate obligation to perform a 
partnership contract. 
Sections 16-11-3 and 10 of the Professional Corporation 
Act state that although the act allows professionals the use of 
the corporate form for business purposes, the act is not intended 
to alter the professional relationship between the 
professional and his client and specifically is not intended to 
alter any law of liability applicable to the relationship. These 
provisions read as follows: 
16-11-3. Purpose of act.—This act shall be so 
construed as to effectuate its general purpose of 
making available to professional persons the 
benefits of the corporate form for the business 
aspects of their practices while preserving the 
established professional aspects of the personal 
relationship between the professional person and 
those he serves. 
16-11-10. Laws as to professional relationships 
not altered.—This act does not alter any law 
applicable to the relationship between a person 
rendering professional services and a person 
receiving such services, including liability 
arising out of such professional services. 
Therefore, the preexisting status of law firm members 
being vicariously liable for the professional misdeeds of their 
fellow members remains applicable to members of professional 
corporations. In Petition of Bar Asso., supra, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court recognized that the liability of attorneys of 
incorporated law firms for the malpractice of their associates 
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should not be limited and that the partnership law of liability 
should continue to apply. Likewise, in First Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 SE 2d 674, (1983), 39 ALR 4th 551, on 
remand, Zagoria v. Du Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga App 120, 306 
SE 2d 433, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously held that a 
lawyer who holds himself out as a member of a law firm, whether 
it is a partnership or a professional corporation, is liable for 
the professional misconduct of other members of the firm even 
when the lawyer has had no involvement in the transaction which 
gave rise to the liability. The court appropriately stated: 
The professional nature of the law practice and 
its obligations to the public interest require 
that each lawyer be civilly responsible for his 
professional acts. A lawyer's relationship to 
his client is a very special one. So also in the 
relationship between a lawyer and the other 
members of his or her firm a special one. When a 
client engages the services of a lawyer the 
client has the right to expect the fidelity of 
other members of the firm. It is inappropriate 
for the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek 
in the shadows and folds of the corporate veil 
and thus escape the responsibilities of 
professionalism. 
We cannot allow a corporate veil to hang from the 
cornices of professional corporations which 
engage in the law practice. 
Therefore, Penelope D. Coffman is jointly and severally 
liable for the acts of Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and the 
professional corporation even if she was not directly involved in 
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representing the Plaintiffs* The trial court's dismissal of her 
from the action must be reversed. 
Conclusion 
The trial court's dismissal of Penelope Dalton Coffman 
from the action must be reversed. In the event that the action 
has been tried before this appeal is heard Penelope Dalton 
Coffman should be ordered subject to and bound by any judgment 
entered against Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and/or the professional 
corporation. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1986. 
-: SSZ>£-?S&ZT*Z-~-. 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS 
Complaint 
Motion To Dismiss Penelope Dalton Coffman 
Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman's Reply To Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum In Opposition To Her Motion To Dismiss 
Ruling On Motion To Dismiss 
Affidavit Of Penelope Dalton Coffman 
Motion To Reconsider 
Ruling On Motion To Reconsider Motion To Dismiss 
NOTE: 
A copy of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss Penelope Dalton Coffman (R. 35-43) is not 
herein included because its relevant content is essentially the 
same as that set forth in Plaintiffs' Argument herein. Also to 
avoid repetition, only the defendant's reply memorandum is set 
forth and the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 32-34) is not included in this addendum. 
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PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P. 0. Box 339 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (301) 259-8173 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wi fe, 
Plai nt i ffs, 
vs. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS, 
a professional corporation 
also known as COFFMAN and 
COFFMAN, ANTHONY M. THURBER, 
and KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO. 
COMPLAINT 
COME NOW the above Plaintiffs and for causes of action 
allege: 
Preliminary Allegations 
1. The Plaintiffs (both hereinafter called "the 
Stewards"), are residents of Grand County, State of Utah. 
2. The Defendants Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and Penelope 
Dalton Coffman are and were at relevant times attorneys licensed 
to practice law in the State of Utah, residing in Moab, Grand 
1 
County, State of Utah. 
3. The Defendants Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and P'enelope 
Dalton Coffman are members of the Defendant law firm Coffman, 
Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation also known as 
Coffman and Coffman, which law firm has its office in Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah. The Defendants Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., 
Penelope Dalton Coffman and Coffman, Coffman and Woods are 
jointly referred to hereinafter as "Coffman". 
4. The Defendant Anthony M. Thurber is and was at 
relevant times an attorney licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah, practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant Kenneth 
A. Okazaki is also an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah, who undertook with Thurber to represent the 
Stewarts. Said Defendants are both hereinafter called "Thurber". 
5. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable for 
the damages suffered by the Stewarts as herein after set forth. 
6. On or/about June 3, 1981, the Stewarts as named 
defendants were each served with a Complaint and Summons in the 
matter of Canyon Homesteads, Inc., a Utah Corporation, as trustee 
for the Ticaboo Townsite Joint Venture, Plaintiffs, vs. Marlin J. 
Stewart and Candice Stewart, Defendants, in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court in Garfield County, State of Utah, hereinafter 
called "The Canyon Homesteads suit." 
7. The Canyon Homesteads suit was based upon amounts 
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'that Canyon Homes Leads alleged was owing by the Stewarts for rent, 
and other expenses arising from a sublease agreement between 
Canyon Homesteads as sublessor and the Stewarts as sublessee 
regarding a grocery store in Ticaboo, Garfield County Utah. The 
Stewarts possessed a claim against Canyon Homesteads, and against 
Plateau Resources, Inc. for breach of warranty, negligent 
mi srepresentation and/or i ntenti onal mi srepresentation whi ch 
claim exceeded the amount of Canyon Homesteads' claim. Said 
claim of the Stewarts exceeded three million dollars for 
compensatory damages arid punitive damages. The Stewart's claim 
was based upon false representations made by Carjyon Homesteads 
officials that the planned town of Ticaboo would absolutely have 
at least. 1,500 residents who would patronize the grocery store. 
Said untrue representation wrongly induced the Stewarts to enter 
into the sublease and act to their detriment. The town of 
Ticaboo thereafter failed to establish a significant population 
and the Stewarts' grocery store business in Ticaboo and in Moab, 
Utah therefore failed. 
8. In order to defend against the Canyon Homestead suit 
and to assert their claim for damages the Stewarts retained 
Coffman who undertook to represent: the Stewarts. 
9. On November 19, 1981 Coffman filed an answer, and a 
counterclaim against Canyon Homesteads, Inc. arid a "crossclai in" 
against Plateau Resources, Ltd. who Coffman named as a "Third 
3 
Party Do Cendant . " 
10. On December 4, 1981 Canyon Homesteads, Inc. and 
Plateau Resources moved to dismiss the Stewarts1 counterclaim and 
"crossclaim" because of Coffman's failure to plead a cause of 
action and to otherwise follow appropriate rules of court, 
11. On June 25, 1982 the presiding judge granted the 
motion and dismissed the Stewarts' counterclaim and crossclaim 
ruling that Coffman had failed to follow the rules of pleading 
and procedure. The court grantee] the Stewarts twenty days to 
file proper pleadings. 
12. Coffman thereafter failed to file proper pleadings 
within the time allowed, faiLed to take proper steps to protect 
the Stewarts' right to assert their defenses arid counterclaim and 
"crossclaim" and allowed the court to dismiss the Stewarts claim 
with prejudice. 
13. When the Stewarts learned that Coffman had not 
protected and was not protecting their rights, they retained 
Thuuber to represent them. Thurber agreed to immediately take 
the necessary steps to save the Stewarts defenses and claims. 
However, Thurber in fact took no steps to protect the Stewarts' 
rights, failed to file an amended counterclaim and "crossclaim" 
allowed the Defendants' counterclaim and "crossclaim" to be 
dismissed with prejudice and allowed a summary judgment to be 
entered uncontested against the Stewarts in the amount of 
4 
$25,740.85 with interest thereon at the rate of 18 percent per 
annum. 
14. The Stewarts were thereafter subjected to writs of 
execution and compelled to surrender to Canyon Homesteads a note 
and security agreement valued over $66,000.00 in order to satisfy 
the judgment and to also pay attorneys fees arid other expenses, 
necessary to negotiate the settlement. 
First Cause of Action 
15. The Stewarts hereby incorporate paragraph 1 through 
14. 
16. Coffman owed the Stewarts the duty to assert their 
defenses and claims with the reasonable care, skill, diligence 
and learning expected of the average lawyer. Coffman breached 
said duty in the following alternative ways, each of which was a 
proximate cause of the below-alleged damages to the Stewarts: 
a. Coffman was negligent in failing to properly and 
adequately plead the Stewarts' defenses arid 
claims against Canyon Homesteads, Inc. and 
Plateau Resources, Inc. and other parties. 
b. Coffman was negligent in failing to timely file 
amended pleadings when granted leave to so do. 
c. Coffman was negligent in not protecting the 
Stewarts' rights in the course of his withdrawing 
as counsel for the Stewarts and in withdrawing 
5 
before he had protected the Stewarts rights. 
17, As a result of the negligent conduct of Coffman, the 
Stewarts suffered the following damages which they are entitled 
to recover from Coffman: 
a. Loss of note and security agreement for over 
$66,682.53 plus accruing interest used to satisfy 
judgment. 
b. $1,570.93 paid to attorneys and appraiser in 
order to negotiate settlement of the judgment. 
c. Not less than $3,000,000.00 for the loss of the 
value of the Stewarts' claims against Canyon 
Homesteads, Inc. and Plateau Resources. 
d. $500,000,00 for emotional suffering resulting 
from loss of the Stewarts' right to their day in 
court, resulting from the loss of their claims 
and resulting from being subjected to writs of 
execution and being compelled to pay the 
judgment. 
e. Not less than $1,000.00 for attorneys fees paid 
to Coffman. 
f. Other damages to be proven at trial. 
Second Cause of Action 
18. The Stewarts hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 
17. 
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19, The Defendant • Thurber ov/ed the Stewarts a duty to 
assert their defenses and claims with reasonable care, skill, 
diligence and learning expected of the average lawyer, Thurber 
breached said duty in the following alternative ways, each of 
which was a proximate cause of the Stewarts damages as set forth 
herein. 
a. Thurber was negligent in failing to properly and 
adequately plead the Stewarts' defenses and 
claims against Canyon Homesteads, Inc., Plateau 
Resources, Inc. and other parties. 
b. Thurber was negligent in failing to prox^erly 
assert and plead a motion to set aside the order 
dismissing the Stewarts' claim against Canyon 
Homesteads, Inc. and Plateau Resources. 
c. Thurber was negligent in not responding to the 
motion for summary judgment and in allowing the 
summary judgment to be entered against the 
Stewarts by default. 
d. Thurber was negligent in failing to properly 
assert and plead a motion to set aside the 
default summary judgment. 
e. Thurber was negligent in failing to immediately 
enter his appearance as counsel in the case. 
20. As a result of the negligent conduct of Thurber the 
7 
Stewarts suffered f.ho damages set forth in paragraph 17 above. 
WHEREFORE, the Stewarts are entitled to judgment against 
the above Defendants jointly and severally in the sum of not lea-
than $3,569,253.46 as set forth above, for their costs of cour 
and for such other relief as the court may deem just. 
DATED this ^L? day of November, 1985. 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Plaintiffs' Address 
61 East 200 South 
Moab, Utah HIV)?. 
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman, 
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and ) 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband ) 
and Wife, ) 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN 
VS. ) 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., ) 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, ) 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS, ) Civil No. 
a professional corporation, ) 
aka COFFMAN and COFFMAN, ) 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and ) 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, ) 
jointly and severally, ) 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW the defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman and moves 
the Court for an Order dismissing her as a defendant in the 
above-entitled lawsuit on the basis that the plaintiffs' 
Complaint against her fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. 
•£* DATED this 7&"- day of December, 19*85). 
HANSON,/bUMN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Penelope Dalton Coffman 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
this JU"^ day of U$S/^XM<<LS , 1985, to: 
Paul W. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 339 
Moab, Utah 84532-0339 
tfCf/sjfes \/*//v+-^ 
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936 
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman 
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone : (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS, 
a professional corporation, 
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. ORAZAKI, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT PENELOPE COFFMAN'S 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS1 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
HER MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil NO. 
DEFENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, replies to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition to her Motion to Dismiss as 
follows: 
POINT I 
DEPENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN HAS 
ENGAGED IN NO CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO 
A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HER 
Although in their Memorandum in Opposition to this 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' point out that Penelope 
Dalton Coffman is referred to as "Coffman"/ along with other 
defendants, plaintiffs have made no specific allegations of 
conduct on the part of Penelope Dalton Coffman which has resulted 
in detriment to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have made blanket 
allegations of negligence but have not specified which acts or 
omissions were engaged in by which individuals. Defendant 
Penelope Dalton Coffman did not at any time engage in the 
representation of the plaintiffs and cannot be personally liable 
in the absence of specific actions on her part which give rise to 
a cause of action against her. See supplemental affidavit of 
Penelope Dalton Coffman. 
POINT II 
MEMBERSHIP IN A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
DOES NOT EXPOSE A MEMBER TO LIABILITY FOR 
THE ACTS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION 
Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman has admitted that she 
is a member of the defendant law firm Coffman, Coffman & Woods, 
and that the defendant law firm is a professional corporation. 
-2-
Plaintiffs1 rely on language of the Utah General 
Partnership Act to allege that a member of a professional 
corporation is jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts 
or omissions of any partner acting in the ordinary course of 
business. Coffman, Coffman & Woods is not a partnership; it is a 
professional corporation. 
Plaintiffs cite language from the Professional 
Corporation Act allowing professionals the use of the corporation 
form for business purposesf while not altering the professional 
relationship between the professional and his client. This 
defendant points out that the language of the Statute 
specifically states that the act "does not alter any law 
applicable to the relationship between a person rendering 
professional services and a person receiving such services/ 
including liability arising out of such professional services." 
(emphasis added) There is no mention of a relationship with or 
liability of other members of a corporation. The emphasis is on 
liability of a person rendering professional services to a person 
receiving such services. 
Section 16-11-5 of the Professional Corporation Act 
reads as follows: 
The Utah Business Corporation Act shall 
be applicable to professional corporations/ 
and they shall enjoy the powers and 
privileges and be subject to the dutiesf 
restrictions and liabilities of other 
corporations/ except where inconsistent with 
this act. 
-3-
There is no section of the Utah Professional Corporation Act 
purporting to apply the provisions of the Utah General Partnership 
Act. 
The Utah Business Corporation Actf which is applicable to 
the Utah Professional Corporation provides that shareholders are 
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors other than 
the obligation to pay the full consideration for shares issued. 
16-10-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
The general law of corporations provide that corporate 
officers are jointly and severally liable only when two or more 
join or participate in a wrongful act. Directors are not liable 
for the wrongful acts of their co-directors if they do no connive 
with themf nor are the executive officers responsible for the 
neglect of duty, negligencef or misconduct of each other in their 
official relations, without proof of joint participation. 
18B AM JUR 2d §§1719, 1720. 
CONCLUSION 
Members of a professional corporation are not vicariously 
*liable for the acts or omissions of other members of the 
corporation without proof of joint participation. Because 
Penelope Dalton Coffman did not undertake to represent the 
plaintiffs, the Complaint, as it relates to her as a named 
defendant, should be dismissed, without prejudice. 
-4-
DATED this /^ day of January, 1986. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
!IM DALTON DUNN 
ANNE SWENSEN 
Attorneys for Aldine J. Coffman, 
Penelope Dalton Coffman, and 
Coffman, Coffman & Woods 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this 
(••-> day of January, 1986, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 339 
Moab, Utah 84532-0339 
V 
T 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY, 
STATE OP UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and CANDICE 
STEWART, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS, 
a professional corporation, 
aka COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, jointly 
and severally, 
Defendants. 
In this case the Defendant, PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
has filed a motion to dismiss the case as to her on the ground 
that this Defendant had no personal involvement in the matters 
alleged in the Complaint. 
The Motion is supported by a memorandum that argues 
the point, but there are no facts presented from which the 
Court can find as matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant, 
contrary to the allegations of the Complaint, had not personal 
involvement in the matters alleged, 
THEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss as to this Defendant 
is denied. . 
DATED this / ~) day of January, 1986. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 5370 


(TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936 
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman 
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone : (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and : 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wife, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Civil No. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., : 
[PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS, : 
a professional corporation, 
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN, : 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. OKAZARI, : 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
GRAND COUNTY ) 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, being first duly sworn, on oath 
deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah. 
2. Affiant is a member of the law firm Coffman, Coffman 
& Wood* 
3. The law firm Coffmanf Coffman & Woods is a 
professional corporation. 
4. Affiant has not at any time undertaken to represent 
Marlin L. Stewart or Candice Stewart in any matter. 
5. Affiant has not corresponded at any time with the 
Stewarts, or either of them, with regard to any legal matter. 
6. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant never 
saw the file, never knew the contents of the file, never 
discussed with any other member of the lawfirm the contents of 
the file, and cannot contribute any information through 
discovery, having no personl knowedge of any of the events 
leading up to the filing of this lawsuit. 
DATED this ib day of January, 1986. 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN 
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Subscribed and Sworn to before me this ///y'fjt\ day of 
Januaryf 1986. 
NtfTARY PUBLIC 
Res iding *tj)wa]tf IfijQbL 
My Commission Expires: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this 
day of January, 1986f a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 339 
Moab, Utah 84532-0339 
gOM/jOCLS 
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936 
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman 
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone : (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wife, 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS, 
a professional corporation, 
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. OKAZARI, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Civil No. 5370 
DEFENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN moves the court to 
reconsider its ruling on her Motion to Dismiss. 
The court denied this defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
January 15r 1986. That ruling was apparently made prior to the 
court's receipt of this defendant's Reply Memorandum and 
supporting Affidavit. 
This defendant therefore respectfully requests that the 
court reconsider its Motion to Dismiss/ including the Reply 
Memorandum and Affidavit currently on file herein. 
DATED this ^ day of Januaryr 1986. 
HANSON/ DUNN/ EPPERSON & SMITH 
M_ 
ANNE SWENSEN 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this 
-
 f-)M - day of January/ 1986/ a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 339 
Moabf Utah 84532-0339 
C^&hr*\ ^^^ 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., ] 
ET AL. , 
Defendants. ] 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
) RECONSIDER MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
1 Civil No. 5370 
The defendant, Penelope Dalton Coffman, has 
previously filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to her, 
and the Court ruled on the motion the same day that a reply to 
the response of the plaintiff resisting the motion was mailed 
to the Court. Because of the uncertainty of time deliveries of 
the U.S. Postal Department, the Court will reconsider its prior 
ruling based upon the matters contained in defendant's reply 
memorandum. 
The undisputed facts show that Coffman, Coffman and 
Woods was a professional corporation and that although the 
defendant, Penelope Coffman, is a member of that corporation, 
she had no personal professional involvement in the matters 
alleged in plaintiffs1 complaint. The Court concludes as a 
matter of law from those undisputed facts that there is no 
cause of action against this defendant. 
THEREFORE/ the motion to dismiss this action as to 
Penelope Dalton Coffman is granted and the attorney for her is 
directed to prepare a formal order in accordance with this 
decision. 
DATED this
 <^z/ daY o f January, 1986. 
-Page 2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing Brief this /y day of July, 1986, 
by mailing four copies thereof, postage prepaid, to defendant's 
counsel of record, Tim Dalton Dunn and Anne Swensen, 650 Clark 
Learning Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101. 
